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I. Introduction 
Views about the role of financial markets in processes of rural development have sel-
dom been dispassionate. Over the past decades, conflicting perspectives on this role have 
influenced rural financial market programs, policies, and procedures, with mixed results. 
This paper is broadly concerned with the interactions among research findings, international 
donor programs, and policy decisions about rural financial markets (RFMs) in developing 
countries.2 It discusses some of the outcomes of the resulting confrontation/collaboration 
among academics, the donor community, and policymakers in developing nations. It illus-
1 Professor of Agricultural Economics and Economics at The Ohio State University. Fi-
nancial support for this and related research has been received through the Cooperative 
Agreement on Financial Resource Management (FIRM) between The Ohio State University 
and the Agency for International Development. This paper reflects the views collectively 
developed by faculty, students, and consultants associated with the Rural Finance Program 
at Ohio State. While acknowledging their continuing influence, the author accepts full re-
sponsibility for the interpretations offered here. The author is specially grateful to the 
numerous authorities, bankers, professionals, and academics in several developing countries 
who have been willing to interact with him and consider experiments in economic policies 
and procedures based on the ideas discussed in this paper. 
2 In tracing the evolution of government intervention, policies, and assumptions, as well 
as research perspectives, and in relating this evolution to the development of The Ohio State 
University vision, this paper borrows from Adams (1987). 
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trates the nature of those interactions from the perspective of the evolution of the contribu-
tions to the debate by the Rural Finance Program at The Ohio State University (OSU). 
The extent to which research efforts and results have followed or led the identifica-
tion of problems and the adoption of policies and practices has not been even over time. 
It would actually be possible for a historian to identify waves of ideas and the cyclical beha-
vior of policymaking" Nevertheless, with funding from the Agency for International Dev-
elopment (AID), The Ohio State University's Rural Finance Program has been the first and 
the most persistent attempt to systematically look at the interactions between financial mar-
ket performance and rural development around the world. 
As a result of its continuing presence, the Rural Finance Program has been a major 
vehicle and focus for the interactions among the three sets of actors. This paper builds on 
this continuity, to highlight some key lessons learned about effective strategies for rural 
financial market development and to identify some unresolved issues, from the perspective 
of the evolution of the OSU research agenda. 
For over three decades, the OSU school has challenged the assumptions of traditional 
rural finance programs, has developed new conceptual frameworks for the understanding 
of RFM activities, has influenced the strategies of donor agencies and the policies of 
developing country governments, and has been directly involved in the promotion of RFM 
innovations. The Ohio State University views have not been static. Rather, the Program's 
focus and perspectives have evolved over time, as a result of new insights among its mem-
bers, interactions with the academic community, and lessons learned, but particularly in 
response to new challenges from the field. 
3 
Infused with a vocation for applied research, the group has struggled in the field in 
efforts to harness insights from theory, results from evaluations and diagnoses [?), and 
common sense about what is or is not feasible, in an attempt to help improve the 
performance of RFMs and mobilize their potentially beneficial influence on the economic 
life of people in the developing world.3 In turn, the Program has continuously attempted 
to utilize lessons from the numerous field experiences in which it has been involved in the 
reassessment of general principles and theory. 
In the process, a successful model for policy dialogue and institution building, based 
on the establishment of long-term academic-practitioner relationships, has been developed 
and tested. For this reason, the lessons reported in this paper refer not only to the "what 
to do and not to do" (substance) and to the "how to do it" (procedure), but also to the "how 
to induce people to do it" (persuassion). Over the years, OSU has made major advances 
in understanding these three sets of questions and the interactions among them. This 
progress has been incremental, with much of the emphasis being dictated by what has been 
important in the field. 
Descriptive research during the 1960s on the main features of RFMs in several 
developing countries was soon followed by an emphasis on policies, in recognition of the 
high social costs and limited effectiveness of the strategies of RFM development adopted 
3 In this respect, the Rural Finance Program belongs to the "practitioners of economics, • 
in the sense of Arnold C. Harberger's (RichardT. Ely) Lecture on "'The Search for Rele-
vance in Economics," 1993). 
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in most countries since the early 1950s.4 Probably as a result of its success in this endeavor, 
the OSU school has been best known for its challenge of the assumptions underlying those 
programs and for the accompanying policy recommendations. 
It has always been clear to OSU researchers that, while very important, correct policy 
frameworks are only a necessary, but not a sufficient condition for improved financial mar-
ket performance (Gonzalez-Vega, 1986b). It was necessary to start from policies, however, 
in view of the extent of the widespread policy failures identified worldwide in the early 
1970s and the colossal political opposition to the prescribed reforms. This opposition 
reflected the magnitude of the implicit subsidies captured by powerful beneficiaries and the 
value of "credit patronage" to influential politicians (Blair, 1984}, as well as the inability of 
those penalized by incorrect policies (typically the depositors and those borrowers excluded 
from access to loans by the constraints generated by the regulatory framework) to get 
organized and promote their interests (frequently defined as uncertain benefits to be reaped 
only in some distant future). 
Given its contentioness, the battle on policies has been fought hard and has been in-
evitably long. In the process, OSU researchers became specially sensitive to the political 
economy dimensions of policy reform efforts (Ladman and Tinnermeier, 1981; Mesalles-Jor-
ba, 1991 ). Rather than taking the constellation of political economy forces as exogenous, 
4 4 OSU research in Colombia, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Laos, and Nigeria in the mid-
1960s, based on farmer surveys, described the terms and sources of loans, lender procedures, 
and the relative importance of informal lending. Soon, the poor performance of most 
agricultural credit programs became evident and Dale Adams (1971) initiated a career of 
making people understand why. 
s 
in its policy recommendations the Program has attempted to explicitly endogenize those con-
straints derived from as well as behavior in the political arena. 
As experience has shown, in the absence of a hospitable policy framework, it is very 
difficult for any initiative in the provision of financial services to marginal clientele to 
flourish. The Rural Finance Program has been interested, however, in improving the supply 
of financial services to large segments of the population and to marginal clientele in 
particular.5 In addition to its global resource allocation implications, policy reform has 
been emphasized by OSU mostly as a precondition for the achievement of the former goal. 
The OSU view has been that, not only do incorrect policies impose efficiency costs 
on society but that, in particular, the set of policies prevailing in the 1970s were ineffective 
in achieving their own ostensible purposes (e.g., helping the small farmer) and that, in order 
to reach (i.e., implicitly "target")] "difficult" clientele, it was necessary to adopt a different 
policy framework. Furthermore, reforms were needed not only in financial policies but, 
particularly, in non-financial policies that affect the creditworthiness of borrowers and the 
level and dispersion of risks and transaction costs in financial markets. 
When and where policies were revised and, particularly, in those instances when OSU 
actually participated in the evaluation, design, or implementation of specific RFM programs, 
the (theoreticaliy prescribed) additional recommendations on financial technology innova-
5 The original concern with "small farmer credit problems" has become only a proxy 
(shorthand) for a preoccupation with difficulties of access to financial services by particular 
groups of society. Recently, the importance of the OSU lessons in the small farmer credit 
realm has become evident in connection with the design of microenterprise credit programs 
{Meyer and Nagarajan, 1988; Gon.za.lez-Vega and Chaves, 1991; Adams and Von Pischke, 
1992; Rhyne and Otero, 1991). 
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tions and institutional strengthening became relevant in the field (Gonzalez-Vega, 1986a). 
Recognition of the relative importance and measurement of the transaction costs incurred 
by all financial market participants shifted OStrs focus from policies to the development 
of cost-effective technologies for the supply of financial services to marginal clientele. 
Success in the implementation of some of the earlier recommendations was the 
source, moreover, of "second-generation" problems (Gonzalez-Vega and Poyo, 1986). For 
instance, the rapid expansion of lending activity by cooperatives in the OSU Rural Savings 
Mobilization Project in the Dominican Republic forced the transfer of more formal liquidity 
and portfolio management technologies to what were initially simple, locally-based organiza-
tions (Poyo, Aguilera-Alfred, and Gonzalez-Vega, 1992). On the other hand, OSU advisors 
became concerned with the need for prudential supervision once the mobilization of rural 
deposits became significant (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1992). This is the focus of some 
of the most important OSU contributions of the past decade. 
The last step in the evolution of the OSU views about RFMs has been an increasing 
concern with the role of contracts/institutions/organizations {Chaves, 1993). Organizational 
design is critical because it is the behavior of individual agents within organizations that 
determines the successful adoption of new policies and technologies. In the same way in 
which during the 1970s OSU adopted the Shaw and McKinnon views on finance and devel-
opment and adapted them to the particular problems of RFMs, in the 1990s the Program 
has increasingly incorporated theoretical developmen~ about the role of institutions and 
information in determining the behavior of economic agents, including the organizations that 
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operate in financial markets.6 OSU's most recent research has focused on these organiza-
tions cum contracts/information cum institutions line of enquiry (Chaves and Gonzalez-Ve-
ga, 1993). 
This paper deals with at least two triads: 
(a) the research/donor-programfpolicymaking interactions in the development of inter-
ventions in and strategies for RFMs, and 
(b) the policy/technologies/organizations package that has increasingly characterized 
OSU's approach to financial markets and rural development. 
Significant lessons for theory /policym.aking/practice have resulted from the continuity 
of relationships between academics and practitioners, cultivated under the Rural Finance 
Program. These lessons are valuable inputs not only for the ongoing strategies for RPM 
promotion in developing countries, but also for the development of financial institution and 
systems in regions such as Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. 
II. Access to Credit: Market Imperfections and Incomplete Organization 
Concern with the degree of access to credit, particularly by small farmers, became 
an important question in growth strategies for the rural areas of the developing countries 
6 As pointed out by Jensen and Warner (1988), work in this area "is progressing under 
various labels," including the economics of contracting (Holstrom and Tirole, 1987), tran-
sactions costs (Williamson, 1975), property rights (Demsetz, 1983), corporate finance (Gross-
man and Hart, 1982), information and performance measurement (De Angelo, 1985), and 
governance and contracting (Posner, 1977), among others cited by them. Similarly, a large 
body of literature on the importance of information in financial constracts has evolved from 
work such as Jaffee and Russell (1976) and Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). 
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early in the 1950s and onwards. As defined, there were two related dimensions of the 
perceived rural credit problem: 
(a) there was a generalized lack of access of the rural population to formal credit 
services, 7 and 
(b) although access to informal credit was apparently widespread, it occurred at very high 
rates of interest 8 
The lack, high price, or excessive burden of credit were seen as major causes of pov-
erty.9 The main assumption was that the observed lack of access to credit and the high and 
dispersed rates of interest charged by moneylenders and other intermediaries in informal 
markets were a reflection of market failure. 
7 There was no similar concern with the lack of access to deposit facilities. 
8 Frequently, the exhorbitant rates quoted were examples of the most extreme rates ob-
served, usually on very short-term loans. In a classic paper on the subject, Wai (1957) re-
ported that "in the majority of the countries the weighted average interest rate in the unor~ 
ganized money market must lie between 24 and 36 per annum" (p. 123). Similarly, the All-
India Rural Credit Survey found an average informal rate between 20 and 24 percent (Mel-
lor, 1966). In the United States, Smith (1964) found that the charges of consumer finance 
companies ranged between 22 and 35 percent, not very different from those observed 
elsewhere. Moreover, a large majority of lenders in the developing countries were "non-
commercial" (friends and relatives), who charged very low rates or no interest at all. 
9 1be following statement is typical of this perspective: "High rates of interest and a high 
burden of farm debt are characteristic features of the agrarian structure in many under-dev-
eloped agricultural countries. Shortage of credit may be both cause and effect of poverty. 
It may be a cause, in that lack of ready money in the hands of the farmer prevents invest-
ment in the farm. But it may also be the effect or symptom of poverty, in that high interest 
rates and a high burden of debt may reflect a chronic insufficienty of the farmer's income, 
and a permanent tendency for consumption to outrun production" (United Nations, 1951). 
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On the one hand, it was presumed that interest rates mostly reflected excessive 
monopoly power.10 On the other hand, it was believed that commercial banks were 
extremely conservative.11 More generally, the perception was that the market could not 
be expected to provide either the adequate volume or the desired channelling of funds to 
priority clientele at "reasonable" prices. Once such "market imperfections" had been 
identified, a "correction" was required and it became clear that "the government had to do 
something about it." The answer was the creation of specialized public development banks 
and of other subsidized, directed, and supervised credit programs. 
This interpretation of the causes and consequences of the lack of access to credit had 
a strong influence on the nature of the policy recommendations. To see why, in any evalua-
tion of the strategies and policies adopted, two questions must be asked: 
(a) was the diagnosis correct, and 
(b) were the policy instruments to deal with the imperfections so identified properly 
10 These views dominated the International Conference on Agricultural and Cooperative 
Credit held at the University of California (Berkeley) in 1952 (Bauer, 1952; Davis, 1952). 
11 "The shortage of credit arises from the fact that the structure of the banking system 
is not adapted to the needs of the small farmer; to the extent that shortage of credit is due 
to such structural deficiencies,it can be remedied by the creation of special agencies to pro-
vide agricultural credit in appropriate forms" (United Nations, 1951). 
12 These are among the questions that must be typically answered for the correct appli· 
cation of neo-classical optimum intervention theory [Bhagwati, 1971]. 
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"Market failure" in the traditional sense was not necessarily the only possible or the 
most important explanation of the patterns observed in RFMs.13 A distinction between 
market imperfections, on the one band, and the consequences of a not-fully developed in-
frastructure or of an incomplete organizational framework, on the other, is useful in this 
connection (Myint, 1985). For instance, in a frictionless economy, all price differentials for 
the same commodity would be interpreted as price distortions.1" Once the presence of 
friction in markets is recognized, however, price differentials may actually reflect the costs 
required to overcome the frictions resulting from an incomplete organizational/institutional 
framework or an inadequate infrastructure.15 
13 It is important to keep in mind that the improved understanding of the sources and 
consequences of market failure in financial markets, particularly in light of information 
issues, is a comparatively recent development. The traditional sources of distortions were 
market power and externalities. Nevertheless, several students of interest rates in informal 
markets concluded that "as long as individual farmers remain small operators with relatively 
petty needs, and perhaps intermittent reluctance or inability to repay, they will go on bor-
rowing in small amounts, each of which will require time to negotiate and recover, and the 
administration costs on each dollar which the moneylenders loan will continue to be high" 
(Bottomley, 1963a). These costs, "together with the premium for risk, are probably the ma-
jor determinants of the high levels of interest rates" (Bottomley, 1963b ). On the basis of 
expected interest rates for short durations, given conservative assumptions, Long (1968) 
concluded that monopoly power was not very great. OSU researchers confirmed these ob-
servations. Moreover, at that time the nature of potential externalities in financial markets 
was not well understood yet. 
1
" This is equivalent to the idea that not all agents have access to credit at the same 
price. 
15 These include marketing, transaction, administrative, insurance, and information costs. 
Thus, regional differences in the price of rice, differentials between farm-gate/wholesale/re-
tail prices, seasonal price variations and the like (including the impossibility to get a par-
ticular commodity in a given location/time) reflect, among others, the costs of harvesting, 
sorting, bulking up, transporting, insuring, storing and the like. The magnitude of these costs 
depends, in turn, on the degree of market organization and of development of the physical 
and institutional infrastructure. 
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It becomes important to determine, therefore, to what extent the patterns observed 
in RFMs were signs of "distortions" to be corrected by some tax-cum-subsidy or another 
intervention in the market, as different from opportunities for an improved allocation of 
resources to be achieved through the further development of the physical and institutional 
in.frastruture and market organization required to reduce transaction costs (North, 1981). 
This distinction is not an easy task in any case, since in most actual situations the symptoms 
of the two sets of causes are mixed up and it is not easy to disentangle them, but to do so 
is critical in the identification of the proper intervention. 
Improvements in the infrastructure and the organizational framework (typical public 
goods) still would have required the actions of the state, but such activities are very different 
from the manipulation of prices and quantities and other interferences with market 
operations that characterized the protectionist strategies adopted since the 1950s. Moreover, 
such improvements in infrastructure and the organizational framework require (frequently 
a substantial) commitment of resources. It is not sufficient, therefore, to identify an oppor-
tunity for potential benefits from intervention. The most critical question is: at what cost? 
The appropriate course of action in this case is, therefore, to compare the expected 
benefits and costs of such investments in social overhead capital (including the opportunity 
costs of the resources so utilized).16 If the costs are higher than the expected benefits, the 
present situation would represent the best attainable position, given the existing technology 
16 On the other hand, it may be assumed that "true distortions," such as private mono-
poly or incorrect government regulation can be removed without any real resource cost in 
economic terms (although there may be political costs). As will be shown below, this may 
not even be the case in these circumstances. 
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and market size, and there would be no reason for government intervention. No interven-
tion is called for, even if prohibitive transaction costs prevent the "market" from emerg-
• 17 mg. 
Moreover, neo-classical optimum intervention theory eventually developed criteria 
for the choice of policy instruments in the presence of market distortions. Given the 
imprecise identification of market failure as an explanation of the patterns observed in 
RFMs, the specific interventions selected were not necessarily the most appropriate from 
this perspective, even if such imperfections were actually important, nor was the dosage of 
the interventions thus selected in any way related to an accurate measurement of the extent 
of deviations of private from social costs. Major welfare losses resulted, therefore, from the 
incorrect choice of both the instrument and the dose of application. 18 
Furthermore, incomplete organization/institutions/infrastructure not only explains 
price differentials and other apparent forms of market failure, but it also imposes severe 
constraints on the implementation of government interventions. In the same way that firms 
and banks in the private sector have to operate through a series of middlemen making up 
the retail-wholesale links to reach the myriad of small agents widely scattered in the rural 
sector, the headquarters of government in the capital cities have to operate through a series 
17 This would be the case, in the specific case, even if some agents continue not no have 
access to formal credit. On the other hand, in general, policy-induced uniform prices, man-
dated to "correct" for observed differentials would, in these circumstances, further undermine 
the tenuous links that allow the existing market to operate. 
18 Even today, despite increased understanding of the nature of market failure in finan-
cial markets, "we are still some distance away from being able to use the theoretical results 
to find a robust class of cases where government intervention is warranted" (Besley, 1m, 
p.l). 
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of their own "middlemen," which make up the "retail-wholesale" links in the administration 
via the district offices all the way down to the village level (Myint, 1985). In the same way 
as market prices change with distance, the effectiveness of these links decreases as one 
moves away from the headquarters to the remoter peripheral areas. Similar, information 
and agency problems increase with distance. Moreover, because governments would have 
to incur in large differentials in costs to provide all sectors with the same level of services, 
not everyone will similarly benefit from potential interventions.19 
Identification of a theoretical reason for intervention is a necessary but not a 
sufficient condition for government action. There are opportunity costs as well as severe 
organizational constraints on the capacity of the authorities to implement any policy. In the 
specific case of the financial market policies adopted since the early 1950s, the focus on 
market failure resulted in major social costs. The extent and consequences of the alleged 
market imperfections were not verified against experience, while the actual interventions 
and their dosage had little or no logical connection to the presumed distortions. The 
implicit assumption was, in addition, that the government possessed all the information re-
quired as well as a complete set of institutions to enforce the policies, while no political 
economy deviations contaminated the objective functions of the authorities. These issues 
have more than a mere theoretical importance. The OSU school claimed that an incorrect 
diagnosis of the reasons for lack of access to credit and optimistic expectations about the 
19 As is the case with financial services, these costs are higher the more scattered the 
recepients of the services and the poorer the development of the infrastructure, as well as 
the greater the difficulty to recruit trained workers for jobs in remote areas. For successful 
solutions of some of these problems in Indonesia, see Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega (1993). 
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absence of government failure led not an inappropriate design of the cure and was re-
sponsible for both the failure of the interventions and the substantial social costs that they 
imposed. 
III. Polley Failures 
Despite growing concern about problems in RFMs in developing countries, little sys-
tematic research and analysis were undertaken until the mid-1960s, when AID funded the 
first OSU efforts.20 Nevertheless, by 1972-73, the AID worldwide "Spring Review of Small 
Farmer Credit" assembled substantial evidence of policy failures from some 60 countries 
(Rice, 1973). To a significant extent, such failures reflected an inadequate diagnosis of the 
problem and the erroneous assumptions underlying the actual policy choices. 
Subsidized small farmer credit programs and specialized agricultural development 
banks were created under the following assumptions: 
(a) All producers need loans all of the time.21 
(b) Informal sources of loans are inadequate and too expensive. 
(c) Small producers cannot save and are not interested in deposit facilities. 
(d) Small farmers cannot pay market interest rates. 
20 Policymakers were confident that most of the answers to these problems could be 
found in the industrialized countries and transferred to the developing countries. Actually, 
many of the experts going around the world were from the Farmers' Home Administration 
or the cooperative from credit system in the United States (Adams, 1987). 
21 One operational implication of this assumption was that "credit demands" could be 
derived by multiplying the number of hectares to be cultivated with each crop by the ex-
pected cost per hectare (from typical farm budgets). 
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(e) Small farmers will not use the loan funds profitably, unless they are strictly 
supervised. 
The implicit general assumption was that credit, particularly when it is subsidized, is 
a powerful instrument to solve all of the problems faced by farmers: credit as a panacea. 
In response to these assumptions, traditional credit programs: 
(a) focused on loans, rather than on financial intermediation, and completely ignored de-
posit mobilization; 
(b) sought to replace with formal institutions (rather than complement) the informal 
sources of funds; 
(c) insisted on targeting loans to particular clientele and for specific purposes, frequetly 
without much concern for risk; 
(d) attempted to strictly supervise (constrain) the use of loan funds; and 
(e) charged interest rates that incorporated a substantial implicit subsidy. 
These views and policies were an important component of the interventionist strate-
gies generally adopted for financial markets in most developing countries. These markets 
were heavily regulated, in order to control both the prices and the amounts of financial 
transactions and to promote some sectors of economic activity at the expense of others. 
These policies not only were eventually not sustainable, but failed to promote growth, effi-
ciency, or social equity. 
In the early 1970s, Shaw and McKinnon and their followers began to chronicle and 
explain the negative consequences of financial repression. The OSU approach to RFMs ma-
tured in parallel to the views on finance and development pioneered by Shaw and McKin-
16 
non. Both visions shared a common perspective on the basic functions of finance and on 
the negative consequences of repressive policies. However, while the Stanford school fo-
cused on macroeconomic stabilization and global financial hberalization, OSU was particu· 
larly concerned with the provision of financial services to the rural population and other 
marginal clientele.22 
Thus, while recognizing the negative implications of repressive policies on standard 
aggregate efficiency and on financial deepening, the most important OSU contnoution was 
to explain why and to illustrate bow these policies had not been able (and could not be 
able) to achieve their ostensible "social" objectives, but bad actually been harmful for most 
marginal clientele (Gonzalez-Vega, 1991). Thus, not only had substantial social costs in 
terms of efficiency been incurred but, more importantly from the OSU perspective, these 
policies had not been able to improve the access to financial services for most of the rural 
population of the developing world. In many instances policies not only had failed, they bad 
made matters worse. 
By the early 1970s, the record already ovetwhelmingly showed that most of the credit 
programs designed from this perspective were not meeting their own objectives.23 The pri-
22 OSU researchers were particularly unrelenting in urging the authorities not to leave 
RFMs out of aggregate financial reforms. They argued that, partial reforms that kept 
agricultural credit programs heavily subsidized, in the midst of an otherwise liberalized 
maket, further increased disincentives for formal financial intermediaries to serve marginal 
clientele (Araujo and Meyer, 1987). 
23 Most of this evidence was assembled in the twenty volumes of the Spring Review of 
Small Fanner Credit (1973), organized by the Agency for International Development, during 
1972-1973. See Donald (1976) for an analytical account of the various activities associated 
with the Review. Additional evidence was compiled in a World Bank agricultural credit 
sector paper (1975) and during a conference at the Food and Agriculture Organization in 
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mary goal of improving access to formal credit was being poorly met. Despite the massive 
flows of funds disbursed (mostly from international donors), access to credit remained sev-
erely limited Only a small proportion of all farmers around the developing world had re-
ceived formal loans. By the mid-1970s, on the average only 15 percent of the farmers in 
Asia and Latin America and 5 percent of the farmers in Africa had ever received credit 
from any institutional source (Donald, 1976). 
The original goal of reducing the cost of borrowing had not been attained, either, ex-
cept for a few large producers. In particular, attempts to target credit had increased tran-
saction costs not only for lenders but mostly for borrowers (Adams and Nehman, 1979; Cue-
vas, 1984; Graham and Cuevas, 1984; Gonzalez-Vega and Gonzalez-Garita, 1987). Targe-
ting had also reduced the quality of credit services, because disbursements became untimely 
and insufficient and procedures were rigid and onerous. For most producers, the non-in-
terest portion of borrowing became the most important component of the cost of funds. 
Thus, subsidized credit turned out to be quite expensive, particularly for small borrowers. 24 
Rome (1975). It became increasingly apparent that most of the policy failures observed 
were common to many countries. OSU not only rigorously documented specific instances 
of, but attempted to provide an explanation of the reasons for these policy failures. 
24 High transaction costs have important regressive consequences. Consider two 
borrowers who are charged 20 percent interest on their loans. In addition, their transaction 
costs (e.g., the cost of trips to the bank branch) are$ 40. For one (small), who borrows$ 
100 and pays $ 20 dollars of annual interest, the total cost of funds is $ 60 (equivalent to 60 
percent of the loan amount). For the other (larger), who borrows S 10,000 and pays S 2,000 
in interest, the total cost of funds is $ 2,040 (equivalent to 20.4 percent of the loan). Rather 
than concentrate on interest rates, those concerned with distribution should focus on 
transaction costs. 
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Widespread, low-cost access to deposit facilities (although not an objective of these strate-
gies) was confined to a few countries, as well. 
The programs had also failed in their attempt to promote the growth of output and 
of productivity. Even when there had been increases in agricultural production, they had 
not been achieved in a cost-effective manner (Braverman and Guasch, 1986). Moreover, 
contrary to ostensible intentions, subsidized interest rates had had regressive implications 
for the distribution of wealth in the rural areas. Small farmer loan portfolios showed much 
concentration (Adams and Tommy, 1974). A few among the numbers of borrowers (typical-
ly 10 percent) captured the largest portion (typically 80 percent) of the funds disbursed and 
the associated subsidies (Gonzalez-Vega, 1977). 
The OSU explanation of this failure to achieve the desired results focused on: 
(a) the incorrect assumptions underlying the policy choices, 
(b) the unrealistic expectations about the capacity of credit programs to achieve several 
(most) of the proposed goals, and 
(c) the negative impact of the policy combinations embraced upon the viability of the fi-
nancial intermediaries selected to carry out those programs. 
Evidence from the field allowed the OSU Program and other researchers to question 
the assumptions of a lack of demand for deposit services in the rural areas and among the 
poor as well as to document the resourceful ways in which informal markets solved the 
problems of lack of access to credit and deposit facilities.25 
25 Research in Africa (Miracle, 1980; Roberts, 1972) and Asia (l.ee, Kim, and Adams, 
1977; Ong, Adams, and Singh, 1976) showed how substantial wealth was devoted to reserves, 
reflecting untapped opportunities for deposit mobilization. Similarly, valuable services 
19 
It became increasingly clear that subsidized credit was a particularly weak instrument 
(at best, not cost-effective; at worst, incapable) to achieve most of the desired objectives: 
the promotion of particular activities (or the adoption of technological changes), a redis-
tnbution of income in favor of small producers, and the elimination of the exploitation that 
presumably characterized informal financial markets. 
Subsidized credit is not a cost-effective means for the promotion of particular activi-
ties. Credit, subsidized or not, cannot make unprofitable investments profitable. Loans do 
not create (inexistent) technologies, do not make the required (unavailable) inputs acces-
sible, do not build the (missing) infrastructure (roads, storage facilities), do not create the 
(absent) markets, do not engender comparative advantages, and do not reduce yield uncer-
tainty. In particular, credit does not modify relative (social and private) profitabilities or 
create investment opportunities that do not exist. Credit merely transfers generalized pur-
chasing power to borrowers who still face the same investment options. Given the funglbili-
ty of funds, it is difficult to ascertain the marginal utilization of this additional purchasing 
power by economic agents typically with multiple sources and uses of funds (Von Pischke 
and Adams, 1980). The limited additionality frequently induced by these credit programs 
sharply increased their cost/benefit ratios. Similarly, credit interventions cannot efficiently 
correct for the negative impact of erroneous non-financial policies. Moreover, while all pro-
ducers are harmed by repressive (e.g., price) policies, only a small proportion have access 
provided by moneylenders, rotating savings and credit associations, and other informal inter-
mediaries were documented (Bouman, 1977). Rather than as a manifestation of market 
failure, informal transactions were viewed by OSU as indicative of potential market solu-
tions of the access problem. 
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to the compensating loans, with a negative impact on equity. Further, credit is a poor ins-
trument to deal with externalities in other markets as well. 
On the other hand, subsidized credit is a powerful instrument for the redistnoution 
of wealth.26 Unfortunately, such redistnoution is inevitably regressive (Gonzalez-Vega, 
1984b ). First, to become a beneficiary of the subsidy a producer must become a borrower. 
Access to subsidized loans is, however, highly restricted and, as a consequence, the largest 
number of producers are excluded from the subsidy. Access is typically more difficult for 
the smallest, the poorest, and those dispersed in remote areas. Second, the amount of the 
subsidy is directly proportional to the size of the loan, while there is a strong correlation 
between loan size and previous wealth. The smallest producers do not get loans--wm-subsi-
dies; the largest borrowers get the largest free transfers of purchasing power. Third, typi-
cally the incidence of the implicit tax used to fund the subsidy (e.g., the inflation tax) is also 
regressive. Fourth, as predicted by the iron law of interest rate restrictions, when the rate 
of subsidy increases, the size of loans for non-rationed borrowers also increases, but the size 
ofloans for rationed borrowers declines (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984a). Fifth, elegtbility require-
ments substantially increase highly regressive borrower transaction costs (Gonzalez-Vega and 
Gonzalez-Garita, 1987). Thus, from a conceptual perspective it is almost impossible to im-
prove the distribution of wealth through a credit subsidy. In practice, credit usually allo-
26 When interest rates do not reflect the social opportunity cost of the claims on re-
sources transferred, there is an implicit subsidy. The magnitude of this subsidy can be sub-
stantial. In the mid-1970s, for example, the subsidy granted to agricultural borrowers was 
equivalent to 4 percent of the GDP in Costa Rica (Vogel, 1984a) and in Brazil (Araujo and 
Meyer, 1987). With consented default, the implicit subsidy is even greater (Aguilera-Alfred 
and Gonzalez-Vega, 1992). 
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cated in return for political favors has benefitted mostly larger and influential farmers (Lad-
man and Tinnermeier, 1981; Gonzalez-Vega and Mesalles, 1993). 
As interest rates became increasingly negative in real terms, beginning in the mid-
1970s most of the policy dialogue among researchers, the donor community, and policy-
makers in developing countries was centered on the cost of credit. Arguments for subsi-
dized credit in RFMs were numerous and convictions about its desirability deeply held De-
bates about financial policies had to be won, moreover, not in the lecture halls, but in the 
legislatures. The strong defense of these subsidies was not based on the yet unwritten pa-
pers on market failure by careful scholars such as Stiglitz or Townsend, but by a mesh of 
vested interests of those in government and those who had handsomely benefited from these 
programs. 27 Given the difficulty of the battle, the OSU Program focused on these policy 
issues, not in blind defense of supply and demand, but from a clear understanding -obtained 
first hand- of the shortcomings of these policies in the field and their inability to promote 
their alleged objectives. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, furthermore, the open crises of 
most traditional agricultural credit programs forced most countries into policy reforms.28 
27 That enlightened interventions be backed by an explicit account ·of the market failure 
that underpins it is a necessary condition for success (Besley, 1992) These political economy 
considerations raise serious doubts, however, about how likely this careful design is in prac-
tice. 
28 Reforms of agricultural credit programs were prompted mostly by their loss of access 
to donor funds, fiscal transfers, and central bank rediscounting. On the other hand, the de-
capitalization of many rural financial intermediaries and the collapse of several agricultural 
development banks highlighted the importance of financial viability. The most dramatic sign 
of the failure of these policies was that the sharp decline in formal agricultural credit flows 
that followed had little or no effect on agricultural output (Adams, 1987). 
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Much of the new vision of RFMs pioneered by OSU was summarized at the Collo-
quium on Rural Finance held in Washington, D.C. in 1981 with ample participation of the 
donor community (Adams, Graham, and Von Pischke, 1984). Among the main lessons pre-
sented at that time were: 
(a) That traditional credit programs had distributed interest-rate subsidies regressively 
and had had a weak impact on loan-use decisions through targeted loans. The most 
important consequence of targeting had been distributive (who had benefitted from 
the subsidized transfers of generalized purchasing power). Otherwise, targeting had 
merely increased both lender and borrower transaction costs. On the other hand, if 
not repressed, financial markets can play a useful role in helping allocate resources 
more efficiently. 
(b) That non-financial policies and other dimensions of the environment (including the 
existing physical and institutional infrastructure) that influence the creditworthiness 
(profitable opportunities that create capacity to repay) and savings capacity of RFM 
clients are critical for the success of financial intermediaries. 
(c) That the traditional methods for evaluation of the impact of credit generally over-
estimated the benefits and underestimated the costs, due to fungibility, the difficulty 
in measuring additionality, and costs external to the borrower. 
(d) That deposit mobilization provides a value service to firm-households, for which 
there is a strong demand in RFMs, and is critical for the resource allocation function 
of financial intermediation. 
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(e) That most informal lenders provide valuable financial services at a reasonable cost 
to borrowers. 
A menu of OSU policy recommendations that went beyond interest rate revisions 
came out of this colloquium. These included global financial reform as a necessary condi-
tion for RFMs to operate effectively; emphasis on the importance of deposit mobilization 
(Vogel, 1984b); a shift in the focus for the evaluation of credit projects from measurement 
of what happens at the borrower level, to an assessment of the performance of the financial 
institution (David and Meyer, 1980); an increased appreciation of the merits of (endoge-
nous) informal financial arrangements (credit programs should not attempt to replace or 
punish moneylenders; Bouman, 1984 ); and the need to devote resources to the development 
of cost-effective financial technologies to reach marginal clientele. 
IV. The Importance of Institutional Viability 
On the basis of a perceived market failure, the governments of most developing coun-
tries were not slow to intervene in their RFMs, in order to correct for the pressumed market 
imperfections and to pursue a host of productive and social objectives. In addition to the 
social costs of these interventions already described, important deadweight losses were in-
flicted in terms of ineffective economic organization (Myint, 1985). That is, these policy-
induced distortions repressed the normal development of the institutions that would other-
wise have gradually evolved to allow for increasing access to financial services by marginal 
clientele . There are two dimensions to these costs. On the one hand, the existing institu-
tions utilized to implement these programs were eventually destroyed, while those specifical-
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ly established for this purpose never had a chance to become viable. On the other hand, 
the monopoly power granted to some of these institutions (through restrictions on entry) or 
their unfair market practices suppresed the development of private organizations that would 
have been created to provide the missing services, as the size of the market grew and tran-
saction costs declined with the development of the physical and institutional infrastructure 
and the provision of a better organizational framework for the operation of markets.29 
From the perspective of the OSU school, the most severe deficiency of the traditional 
rural financial organizations created from the protectionist perspective has been their lack 
of institutional viability. A viable financial institution is self-sustaining and is valued by its 
clientele. This requires an organization that is able to cover all of its costs, provides high 
quality services, reaches increasing numbers of customers, is dynamic in providing new finan-
cial services and products, and actively searches for ways of improving its efficiency, as 
reflected by the magnitude and degree of dispersion of the transaction costs incurred by its 
depositors, its borrowers, and by the financial intermediary itself. Viable institutions possess 
credibility and are able to mobilize deposits from the public, collect their loans, and retain 
good management and staff (Meyer, 1988; Gonzalez-Vega, 1990, Rhyne and Otero, 1991). 
The lack of viability of many rural finance organizations has been reflected by the 
steady reduction of their relative importance within the financial sector of many developing 
countries, as most of them have not been able to increase and, in many instances, even to 
19 This was the case when the banks were nationalized or, as in the case of Costa Rica, 
when only the state-owned banks were allowed to mobilize deposits (Gonzalez-Vega and 
Mesalles, 1993). Unfair practices by subsidized organizations may also outcompete more 
efficient rivals, only to disappear soon because of their lack of self-sufficiency (Graham, 
Nagarajan and Ouattara, 1993). 
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sustain the flow of their loanable funds, in real terms. Rather, their lending capacity has 
sharply decreased over time, as they have not protected their portfolios from inflation, have 
not vigorously collected their loans (to be able to grant new credit), have not aggressively 
mobilized local resources (to be able to widen the range of their services), and particularly, 
as they have lost the support of their clientele, in view of the poor quality of their services 
and the high transaction costs that they impose on them. Moreover, as their institutional 
weaknesses have become increasingly evident, they have lost the support of the international 
donors as well and, as a result, their loanable funds have substantially declined. 30 
Given their dependency on political agencies for the supply of their funds, there has 
been a great deal of intrusion in the operations of these lenders, in the sense that the de-
cisions about who to lend to, what to lend for, and in what terms and conditions to lend 
have not been made by the intermediary (agent), but have been imposed from the outside 
by the sources of the funds (principals). The criteria used have not necessarily been com-
patible with the financial viability of the organizations (Poyo, Gonzalez-Vega, and Aguilera-
Alfred, 1993). 
The concern with viability springs from a clear recognition of scarcity. The experi· 
ence of the 1980s has shown that foreign donor programs and fiscal budgets are not infinite 
sources of funds for rural financial institutions (Gonzalez-Vega, 1989). This is most impor-
tant from an outreach perspective. There is little hope for reaching the numbers of rural 
firm-households (or the poor) who are potential borrowers without self-sufficient financial 
30 Ironically, their lack of viability has reflected, in large part, their strong dependenqr 
on outside funding, from donors, governments, and central banks. During the 1980s they 
learned that it is not possible to obtain steady and reliable funding from these sources. 
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institutions (Rhyne and Otero). Otherwise, only select groups will benefit from the subsi-
dized programs. The amounts required are well beyond the ability and wi11ingness of gov-
ernments and donor agencies. Thus, viability matters for both efficiency and equity consi-
derations. 
From the OSU perspective, financial viability not only matters a lot, but it is also a 
useful conceptual hub from which to examine the importance of policies and procedures, 
technologies, and organizational design. By clustering all of these dimensions of an inter-
mediary's performance around this hub, it is possible to more fully understand why all of 
these components are intimately linked (interact and reinforce each other) and why success 
is the outcome of particular combinations of these elements. While the specific combination 
that is appropriate in each case must be a function of initial conditions (stage of develop-
ment, previous macroeconomic history, social and cultural factors) as well as economic and 
political opportunities, the OSU researchers are constantly surprised by the commonality of 
elements in successful (as well as unsuccessful) blends of these components. For these pur-
poses, sustained practical experience has proved to be an effective teacher. Such common 
traits have allowed the OSU school to offer some basic generalizations (principles) that can 
serve as a guide for theory, policymaking, and practice. 
The starting point must be a clear understanding of what it is that financial services 
do for firm-households. Additional command over resources, through loans, allows them 
to take advantage of economic opportunities. Secure places to store their assets allow them 
to manage their reserves and face uncertainty, as well as to accumulate purchasing power 
to take advantage of future investment opportunities. Access to open lines of credit gives 
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them additional security. These dimensions define the quality of financial services for them. 
Farmers are interested not only in access to sufficient purchasing power to take advantage 
of their opportunities; they also want the funds to be timely disbursed, the loan procedure 
to be easy and flexible, the amortization schedule to adequately correspond to his cash flow, 
and the loan term to be sufficiently long. H this is not the case, the farmer will not be able 
to fully take advantage of available opportunities. The potential borrower wants, in par-
ticular, access to a financial intermediacy that offers timely, reliable, encompassing and, 
above all, permanent services. 31 
The most important reason why a concern with viability matters is because it elicits 
appropriate incentives. For example, viability and low default rates are intimately rei· 
ated. Clearly, poor loan recovery destroys the viability of the intermediacy. What must be 
understood, however, is that viability influences, in turn, repayment discipline. It is not easy 
to establish creditworthiness. For this purpose, most important for the lender is to acquire 
information about the potential borrower. This information is accumulated through expe-
rience and a continued relationship with a particular client. Once reputation as a good bor-
rower has been established, it is a valuable intangible asset for the client. Clearly, this asset 
will be more valuable if the credit program is permanent rather than transitory. This asset 
will be more valuable, if the credit program is reliable, as the expected losses from lack of 
access to credit when it is needed can be very high. The borrower's main interest is, there-
31 This perspective is the secret behind successful financial programs for poor clientele. 
As Patten and Rosengard (1991) claim, •the rural populace needs flexibility and discretion 
to respond to continually changing and highly localized circumstances, and requires perma-
nent access to stable institutions, capable of executing essential banking functions" (p. 6). 
28 
fore, to develop a long-term relationship with a permanent lender. This is, indeed, the na-
ture of the implicit contract with the informal moneylender. Fear of severing this contract 
will keep borrowers away from non-permanent formal credit programs. 
When rural financial institutions lack viability, their survival is questioned by many, 
including their own clientele. Increasing levels of loan default evidence their loss of support. 
Default is the signal that the borrowers are no longer interested in the survival of the insti-
tution. Since they anticipate it not to be able to provide a permanent service, the expected 
value of their relationship with the intermediary is low. In the absence of vigorous collec-
tion efforts, demonstration effects (if those who do not pay get away with it, why should I 
pay?) make theirs a self-fnlfi11ing prophecy. 
This is one of the most important ways in which interest rates and loan default are 
linked. The recent literature bas emphasized the impact of high interest rates on the len-
der's profits, through adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). It has raised concerns 
about interest rates becoming too high in real terms. In the environment of the traditional 
credit programs, with highly negative real rates of interest and inadequate intermediation 
spreads, however, too low rates of interest actually induce default. The intermediary's losses 
are perceibed by the borrowers as a signal of the lack of permanency of the institution and 
repayment declines. Risk of default may not be merely a direct function of interest rates, 
therefore, but may actually follow a U-shaped curve. Images of lack of viability for too low 
rates induce default, while adverse selection at too high rates may also increase the riskiness 
of the portfolio. While ceilings that keep interest rates negative in real terms may thus con-
tribute to increased default, in the case of high rates the appropriate policy intervention may 
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be to eliminate moral hazard on the part of the banks, through effective prudential regula-
tion and supervision (McKinnon, 1989; Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1992).32 
Concern over interest rate policies has reflected as well attention to their impact on 
the viability of financial organizations. Effectively earned (rather than simply accrued) in-
terest must cover expected inflation, operating costs, and reserves against losses from de-
fault, if de :apitalization is to be avoided Beyond this, concern with interest rates reflects 
a recogruuon of their influence on the behavior of all market participants. Too low rates 
of interest discourage depositors, allow poor investments by borrowers, attract rent-seekers, 
and may underprice the cost of capital. They also create a paternalistic culture within fi-
nancial organizations that is not conducive to viability. 
Concern with targeting is also linked to preoccupations with viability. The purpose 
of targeting the end use of funds has been frustrated by fungibility, but both targeting and 
excessive borrower supervision have increased lender and borrower transaction costs. High-
er lending costs have further reduced viability, while very high borrowing costs have effec-
tively excluded many potential (small) borrowers from access to formal loans. Evidence in 
the field suggests that subsidized interest rates frequently lead to more than proportional 
increases in borrower transaction costs, particularly for small clients, as a consequence of 
the rationing mechanisms that become inevitable, and thus the total cost of the funds in-
creases when rates are lowered (Gonzalez-Vega and Gonzalez-Garita, 1987). Furthermore, 
targeting and other requirements on borrowers reduce the quality of the services received 
and, thereby, decrease the value of the relationship with the intermediary. On the other 
32 Prudential supervision would not prevent, of course, the rationing behavior of banks. 
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hand, targeting reduces the scope for already specialized agricultural lenders to diversify 
their loan portfolio and decreases their degrees of freedom in screening applicants. Evi-
dence from the field indicates that the rigidity introduced by targeting in the risk-manage-
ment activities by the lender increases default (Aguilera-Alfred and Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). 
The emphasis on deposit mobilization has also been intimately linked to the concept 
of viability. Given a continuous demand for safe and convenient means to manage liquid 
funds and accumulate reserves, many more firms and households can be served through de-
posit facilities than through credit.33 Deposits provide an entry point into formal finance 
largely under the client's control. On the other hand, while small, short-term loans are 
usually provided by informal sources at low transaction costs, formal loans are demanded 
in response to special opportunities and require demonstration of creditworthiness (Von 
Pischke, 1978). A deposit connection with the intermediary will facilitate the eventual ac-
cess to loans, by providing information to the lender, creating a basis for mutual trust, and 
facilitating the accumulation of a downpayment (the deposit funds) as the borrower's contri-
bution (deductible) in the investment project. Given the nature and extent of these econo-
mies of scope for the intermediary, deposit mobilization is critical for financial viability. 
Moreover, deposits increase the intermediary's independence from outside "principals" (and 
free it from the whims of donors and politicians) and protects it from rent-seeking and polit-
33 Most OSU researchers believe that, once both deficit and surplus units are taken into 
account, substitution effects and the positive income effect for deficit units dominate the 
negative income effect for surplus units and savings increase with interest rates (Hicks). 
They also believe, however, that the interest elasticity of the composition of wealth is much 
greater and that what really matters is the impact of deposit mobilization on the quality of 
the stock of assets in the economy (McKinnon, 1973; Fry, 1978). 
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ical intrusion, while depositors force the organization to higher standards of financial dis-
cipline (Poyo, Gonzalez-Vega, and Aguilera-Alfred, 1993).34 
In summary, even when created with the best of intentions, in practice the traditional 
rural financial institutions designed from the protectionist perspective found it very difficult 
to target subsidized loans, postpone concerns about creditworthiness and risk management, 
and remain financially viable at the same time. Financial viability is critical, however, not 
only from the perspective of an efficient utilization of society's scarce resources, but also as 
a means to widely achieve "social" goals. From this perspective, the OSU school has empha-
sized institutional viability as a key component of any evaluation of RFM programs.35 
V. Access, Transaction Costs, Technologies and Organizations 
The failure of the subsidized and targeted credit programs designed from the earlier 
interventionist perspective has been well documented by OSU researchers and others. To 
the extent to which this failure has reflected inadequate policies and regulations, policy re-
form has been needed.36 If one of the major objectives of such reform is (as the OSU Pro-
34 This beneficial role of deposit mobilization requires, however, adequate prudential 
regulation and supervision (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1992). 
35 The implicit assumption is that, in a viable financial institution in which loans are 
demanded and repaid and savings deposited, financial intermediation is contributing to im-
proved welfare and, to the extent to which the poor have access to the institution, to poverty 
alleviation (Rhyne and Otero, 1991). The key remaining question is how to improve the ac-
cess of the poor to these financial services. 
36 In general, with these reforms the role of the state has shifted from the control of 
prices and quantities (in substitution of market forces) to the promotion of the stability of 
the monetary system and the solvency of intermediary institutions (including the protection 
of depositors from the potentially opportunistic behavior of depository institutions). 
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gram believes it should be) to facilitate access for large segments of the population to a 
wide set of financial services, including not only loans but also deposits and facilities for the 
transfer of funds, then the critical question is: what else is needed? Although suitable pol-
icies are a necessary condition, they are not sufficient to rapidly increase access to financial 
services by marginal clientele.37 
OSU researchers believe that improved access to financial services is determined by 
changes in the environment in which financial institutions operate, changes in the policies 
that regulate their behavior, changes in their organizational design and operational proce-
dures, and changes in financial technologies (Gonzalez-Vega, 1986a). Research at OSU dur· 
ing the 1980s attempted to gain a better understanding of these other determinants of the 
successful expansion of access. 
The point of departure has been a clear recognition that the provision of financial 
services is not an easy task. It is particularly costly when the clients are small, heteroge-
neous, and dispersed in not densely populated areas. To some extent, these difficulties are 
not unique to the provision of financial services: it is generally not easy to provide education 
or health in remote, sparsely populated areas. In addition, finance is particularly difficult 
because of the intertemporal nature of the transactions involved. The promise to repay in 
the future, in exchange for purchasing power now, may not be fulfilled. Financial markets 
are about the management of this risk. The ability to successfully screen potential borrow-
37 Earlier experience has shown that in a highly financially repressed environment it is 
almost impossible for any institution to attain this goal in any significant scale. Policy re-
form is a necessary condition in this sense. It does not mean that there are no important 
roles for the state to play, the specifics of which will be determined by the particular initial 
conditions. 
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ers, monitor the actions of those who receive loans, and enforce contracts implies the choice 
of appropriate financial technologies. These technologies are intensive in the use of infor-
mation and in mechanisms for the enforcement of contracts. Major developments in finan-
cial theory, associated with agency problems and asymmetric information, have provided use-
ful explanations of the complexity of these lender-borrower relationships.38 
Risk management through signal1ing, screening, monitoring, and collecting efforts are 
at the core of the RFMs problem. In past strategies, perceptions of risk and development 
of the tools for dealing with information and risk were not part of the available technologies 
or of the organizational culture of the traditional credit programs. Not only are these dif-
ficult tasks, but under financial repression technological innovation was retarded. In part 
for these reasons, sufficiently cost-effective technologies to provide financial services to 
marginal clientele are not widely available and have been successful in only a few places.39 
Information use and the enforcement of contracts result in transaction costs for all 
market participants. These costs have major consequences for resource allocation. What 
matters, for production and investment decisions, is the total cost of the funds for borrowers, 
including both interest and transaction costs. What matters to savers is the net return on 
deposits, after transaction costs are substracted from interest earned. What matters for the 
intermediary is the extent to which its spread covers the costs of funds ·mobilization and the 
38 For some excellent examples of the application of these theoretical developments, see 
the papers for the Symposium on Imperfect Information and Rural Credit Markets, in the 
September, 1990 issue of The World Bank Economic Review, as well as many of the papers 
for the Conference for which this paper was prepared. 
39 For a discussion of examples of the successful adoption of appropriate technologies 
in Indonesia, see Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega (1993). 
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costs and risks of lending and leaves a profit that allows for capitalization and growth. The 
OSU school claims that the best indicator of financial progress is a reduction in the level 
and dispersion of the transaction costs incurred by all, actual and potential, market partici-
pants. From the perspective of this conceptual framework, the measurement of transactions 
costs becomes an important task in the evaluation of RFMs. 
During the 1980s, OSU researchers measured these transaction costs and explored 
alternative explanations of their magnitude and behavior.40 In general, the production of 
financial services displayed constant or increasing returns to scale. Cost complementarities 
between loans and deposits were observed in most cases. This supports the view that de-
posit mobilization increases financial viability. Specialized government banks showed high 
loan administration costs in all countries, reflecting both differences in the clientele served 
(technology) and the agency costs resulting from deficiently defined property rights. 
Similarly, the transaction costs of borrowing and depositing were measured in several 
countries:'~ The observations clearly reflect the very regressive distributional effects of 
borrowing transaction costs. Results from econometric exercises consistenly reported a 
40 Bank cost functions were estimated in Bangladesh (Srinivasan, 1988), Honduras (Cue· 
vas, 1984), the Dominican Republic (Cuevas and Poyo, 1986) and Mexico (Chavez-Presa, 
1988). A profit function approach was used in Honduras (Camacho, 1988). Cost-allocation 
exercises were also undertaken in the Philippines (Untalan and Cuevas, 1988), Togo and 
Niger (Cuevas, 1987), and Costa Rica (Gonzalez-Garita, 1987), among others. 
41 Borrower costs were measured in the Philippines (Abiad, 1990), Bangladesh (Ahmed, 
1982}, Honduras (Cuevas, 1984}, Costa Rica (Gonzalez-Vega and Gonzalez-Garita, 1987}, 
Niger (Graham, Cuevas, and Negash, 1986) and elsewhere. Reductions in depositor transac-
tion costs were found to be the most important determinant of the success of deposit 
mobilization by the Agricultural Development Bank in the Dominican Republic (Guerrero). 
Khalily (1987) showed the extent to which the expansion of the banking network in Ban-
gladesh reduced transaction costs for depositors. 
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negative elasticity between transaction costs per unit and loan size. A tO-percent increase 
in loan size typically reduces borrowing transaction costs by 6-7 percent. The results also 
clearly indicate a trade-off between borrower transaction costs and interest rates. Thus, 
increases in interest rates may not necessarily increase the total costs of borrowing by the 
same amount of the rate increase.42 In the Dominican Republic (Guerrero, 1988), reduc-
tions in transaction costs for savers were the most important determinant of the success of 
deposit mobilization in the rural areas. 
Questions about organizational design emerged in the field as a consequence of se-
cond-generation problems encountered during the implementation of recommended policy 
reforms and the adoption of new financial technologies. This was the case, for instance, 
with respect to deposit mobilization. OSU experiments in several countries confirmed the 
existence of a strong demand for deposit facilities in the rural areas.43 Agricultural devel-
opment banks, with a large established network of branches, as well as rural credit unions 
became important vehicles for the mobilization of local deposits, at relatively low marginal 
costs for the intermediary, and with a substantial reduction of the depositor's transaction 
costs. Introduction of the new service was not easy, however, given the internal system of 
incentives within these organizations. Rewards had to be designed for the management and 
staff of the bank, on the one hand, or the membership of the credit unions, on the other, 
42 In Costa Rica, transaction costs accounted for 46 percent of the total cost of 
borrowing on the average. In the case of small loans, however, this proportion can increase 
significantly. Discussions focusing only on interest rates are clearly misplaced. 
43 See Burkett and Vogel (1987) on Peru, and Vasquez (1986) on the Dominican Repub-
lic. 
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in order to obtain their cooperation. The idea that depositors will introduce additional 
discipline in these organizations was amply confirmed (Poyo, Gonzalez-Vega, and Aguilera-
Alfred, 1993 ). 
On the other hand, emphasis on deposit mobilization eventually posed serious ques-
tions about prudential regulation and supervision, in order to constrain opportunistic beha-
vior (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1992). In several countries, OSU projects have sponsored 
strengthening of prudential supervision, in general, and the extension of the authority of the 
superintendent of banks to cover non-bank intermediaries, such as credit unions. 
The importance of organizations has been evident from both observations from OSU 
projects and the evaluation of other experiences (Chaves and Gonzalez-Vega, 1993). The 
design of organizations is vital because, in the last instance, it will determine the perfor-
mance of the financial institution. Although adequate financial policies and technologies 
are always necessary, they will not be adopted and properly implemented if they do not re-
spond to the interests of the owners, management, and staff of the organization. In the end, 
performance depends on the choices made by individuals. Organizations are important be-
cause they define the structure of incentives that influence those choices and the constraints, 
in addition to the traditional ones, that shape their behavior. A successful performance, 
given existing constraints, will occur when it is in someone's best interest. 
Over three decades, faculty, students, and consultants of the Rural Finance Program 
at The Ohio State University have attempted to understand both the constraints and the in-
centives that influence access to financial services by marginal clientele and to put this 
knowledge to work in efforts to improve the performance of rural financial markets. 
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